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INTRODUCTION
1

“Neither a borrower, nor a lender be,” warned Shakespeare, but
borrowing and lending is now a robust and lucrative industry within our
modern economy. Yet even today, powerful lenders must be kept under
the close watch of state and federal regulators in order to protect the
inexperienced borrower. This Note analyzes the Helping Families Save
2
Their Homes Act of 2009 (hereinafter “Homes Act”), which amends
3
the Truth in Lending Act of 1968 (hereinafter “TILA”), to create a safe
harbor from liability for servicers in connection with entering mortgage
loan modifications and other loss mitigation plans. The Homes Act also
4
amends the Hope for Homeowners program by attempting to provide
greater incentives to mortgage servicers to modify existing mortgages
instead of resorting to foreclosure. Further, it creates a new disclosure
requirement that must be provided to borrowers by purchasers and
assignees of residential mortgages in the secondary mortgage market.
Since 2007, over two million families have lost their homes, and
studies show that many more millions will lose theirs over the next
5
several years. Even though the crisis has impacted all people across the
United States, Hispanic and African-American communities have been
considered the “ground zero” of this economic catastrophe, and this
problem is coupled with the fact that minorities have generally suffered
6
the greatest job losses as well. Although Congress and the mortgage
servicing industry have attempted loan modification reform in the past,
7
many of these efforts have not produced effective results. As part of a
1

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 3.
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632.
3
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2010).
4
12 U.S.C. § 1715z-23 (2009).
5
ROD DUBITSKY ET AL, CREDIT SUISSE, FORECLOSURE UPDATE: OVER 8 MILLION
FORECLOSURES EXPECTED 1 (2008); About IFLA, INST. FOR FORECLOSURE LEGAL
ASSISTANCE, http://www.foreclosurelegalassistance.org/about (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
6
Conor Dougherty & Miriam Jordan, Recession Hits Immigrants Hard, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 23, 2009, at A10; Michael Powell & Janet Roberts, Minorities Affected Most as New
York Foreclosures Rise, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2009, at A1.
7
PENN INST. FOR URBAN RESEARCH, RETOOLING HUD FOR A CATALYTIC FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: A REPORT TO SECRETARY SHAUN DONOVAN 15 (2009) [hereinafter
2
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multi-pronged approach to combat the foreclosure crisis, the Homes Act
adds incentives and extra pressures to encourage mortgage servicers to
modify loans, instead of foreclosing on residential property. These
provisions involve protecting servicers from TILA liability if they enter
into “qualified loss mitigation plans” with homeowners, creating
additional TILA disclosure requirements to increase transparency in the
secondary mortgage market, and offering payments to servicers if they
refinance mortgages in cooperation with the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (hereinafter “HUD”) through the Hope for
Homeowners program. A judicial approach to the foreclosure crisis is
also important, but in passing this bill Congress rejected Senator Dick
Durbin’s proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that would
have allowed U.S. Bankruptcy Judges to modify residential mortgages
8
in the face of impending foreclosure.
It is critical for the federal government and mortgage industry to
follow through with this legislation that increases consumer ability to
modify home mortgages, in addition to promoting potential judicial
mortgage modification authority, in order to stabilize the U.S. housing
market. Other strategies for mitigating the foreclosure crisis include
promoting the spread of financial information, making significant
improvements to the standard mortgage contract, and developing new
financial consumer products to reduce the strain upon homeowners who
face periods of financial distress.
This Note starts by addressing the background of the U.S. home
mortgage crisis that began in the latter half of 2007, and continues as of
the date of this publication. There follows an examination of a few of
the major types of mortgages that exist today, some important past
legislation regarding home mortgage lending, and previous failed
attempts at reform. Next, this Note analyzes the Homes Act to see if it
offers a better source of reform, and compares it to a piece of parallel
state legislation from New Jersey. This Note concludes by
recommending other avenues for home mortgage modification and
reform, including the potential for judicial modification via bankruptcy
court, and modern pro-consumer financial products that might alleviate
the distressful situation affecting millions of Americans today.
RETOOLING HUD]; About IFLA, supra note 5.
8
155 CONG. REC. S4915, 4917-4918 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Sen. Dick
Durbin).
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BACKGROUND OF THE HOME MORTGAGE CRISIS

It is a scary thought that, as a result of foreclosure, one woman,
9
Sheri West, lived out of her car and used her old backyard as a toilet.
As a result of significant high-interest credit card spending, West and
her husband (now ex-husband), of Cleveland, Ohio, were left with a
sizeable mortgage on their home despite many years of timely
10
payments. Because both she and her ex-husband held jobs, she could
not continue payments on her single salary after her divorce, and instead
accepted a cash payment of $2500 from the mortgage company to move
11
out of the house she lived in for nearly ten years. Though forced to
move between friends’ and relatives’ homes, homeless shelters, and her
car, she still “want[s] to eventually own a house again. . . .That’s the
12
American dream. That’s what everybody wants.”
Two schoolteachers in San Diego, California only expect to make
payments on their “interest-only” mortgage until 2013, at which time
13
the monthly payments will increase by 20%. This type of home
mortgage allows homeowners to pay only interest for the first ten years,
but the principal must be paid off in the next twenty years (instead of
the usual thirty), resulting in a higher monthly payment during the
14
principal payment period. The schoolteachers decided to cut out home
repairs in order to reduce their spending, as they search for a way to
15
modify the terms of their mortgage agreement.
In some of the country’s weakest economic communities, such as
Newark, New Jersey, over 1800 homes were in foreclosure by late
16
2008, mainly as a result of a 60% subprime mortgage rate in the city.
Minority consumers in low-income areas, like most Newark residents,
often have severely restricted access to home loans at affordable prices

9

Peter S. Goodman, Foreclosures Force Ex-Homeowners to Turn to Shelters, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009, at A1.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
David Streitfeld, As an Exotic Mortgage Resets, Payments Skyrocket, N.Y. TIMES,
Sep. 9, 2009, at B1.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Jeffery C. Mays, Boarded-Up and Foreclosed, Houses Await Action by Newark and
Partners, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2009, at NJ13.
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with beneficial terms. Instead, mortgages offered to “lower-income
and credit-impaired borrowers have higher interest rates and less
favorable terms than the conventional prime loans that serve the
18
mainstream market.” The dearth of easily accessible financial
information in these communities, in addition to most residents’ general
lack of financial sophistication, may cause minority borrowers to
depend on local mortgage brokers, instead of shopping for lower-cost
19
loans or using cheaper, internet-based institutions. Part of this Note
will address the fact that certain minority groups, which have lower
financial literacy skills and decreased access to consumer education,
20
often obtain less-favorable subprime loans.
From 1997 to 2005, homeownership rates in the United States
steadily increased for all age, racial, and income groups and geographic
21
regions. The largest increases in homeownership rates were among
people aged thirty-five and under with below-median income, and also
22
among Hispanics and African Americans. The three-fold combination
of aggressive mortgage lenders, home value appraisers, and complacent
borrowers initiated the chain reaction leading to the home mortgage
23
crisis. Mortgage originators sold off loans to securitizers, and therefore
stopped worrying about the great risks involved with indigent
borrowers. Furthermore, these originators made virtually no effort to
determine borrowers’ ability to repay the loans and rarely verified
borrowers’ income with the IRS, even if they had signed the
24
authorization forms.
Such questionable tactics may have also had a subtle
discriminatory component that created a disproportionately negative

17

William Agpar & Allegra Calder, The Dual Mortgage Market: The Persistence of
Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND
HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 102 (Xavier De Souza Briggs, ed., 2005).
18
Id.
19
FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE AND URBAN POLICY, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW, THE
HIGH COST OF SEGREGATION: EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RACIAL SEGREGATION
AND SUBPRIME LENDING 3 (2009).
20
Id.
21
ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 5 (2008).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 6.
24
Id.
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25

impact on minority homeowners and their communities, as noted by a
racial gap between white and minority borrowers in the home mortgage
26
market. In 2001, lending at prime rates accounted for approximately
75% of all home mortgage lending to whites, but less than 50% of
27
lending to Hispanics, and only 40% of lending to African Americans.
As a result of such lending practices, certain groups were forced to the
subprime markets. Thereafter, homes are lost because of poor or
unreasonable mortgage terms, credit is crippled, the chances of
receiving a future home loan decrease, and the cost of credit for other
28
important purposes increases. The foreclosed homes remain vacant for
long periods of time and become targets for criminal activity, thereby
discouraging families or new businesses from moving into the
29
community. In an area like Newark, where there is already a long
history of community instability, high foreclosure rates further
30
stigmatize the city and its residents.
A. Types of Home Mortgages in the U.S. and Delinquency Rates
There are three primary types of home mortgages, and this
31
categorization relates to the final investor in the mortgage. The first
type is a note held in a bank or thrift portfolio, where mortgage holders
have an undivided interest in the notes, giving them a significant
amount of freedom to modify mortgages to meet a homeowner’s
32
financial situation. Because these entities own the mortgages and
therefore have a direct financial interest in avoiding foreclosure, they
are in the best position to identify potential solutions, such as loan
33
principal reduction and efficient refinancing strategies. However, a
bank or portfolio’s disincentive to modification is the immediate writedown of value in these assets, resulting in a reduction of net income for

25

Agpar, supra note 17, at 111.
Id. at 109.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 118.
29
Id.; Mays, supra note 16.
30
Agpar, supra note 17, at 118; Mays, supra note 16; see also N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:10B-37(h) (2008).
31
RETOOLING HUD, supra note 7, at 20.
32
Id.
33
Id.
26
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34

the mortgage holder. This category of mortgages comprises
approximately 27% of all outstanding mortgage debt and has a 10%
35
delinquency rate.
The second type of home mortgages are those held by the Federal
National Mortgage Association (hereinafter “FannieMae”) and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (hereinafter “FreddieMac”),
36
two government sponsored enterprises. As a result of the Treasury
Department’s intervention in September 2008, the federal government
effectively operates these two home loan entities and may be in a
favorable position to initiate creative solutions to deal with the
37
mortgage crisis. This category of mortgages comprises approximately
51% of single-family mortgages nationwide, and carries a 17%
38
delinquency rate.
The last major category of home mortgage are those held in private
39
label securities (hereinafter “PLS”). These mortgages, most originated
40
as subprime or through Alt-A terms, have been sold into private
securitization trusts, and are the most difficult to address because they
41
are bundled together in private securities. Further problems arise
42
because potential solutions have been complicated by recent litigation,
such as Greenwich Financial Services Distressed Mortgage Fund 3,
43
LLC v. Countrywide Financial Corp., discussed infra. This category of
mortgages consists of only about 16% of outstanding mortgage debt, but
44
has a staggering 58% “serious delinquenc[y rate].”
34

Id.
Id.
36
Id.
37
RETOOLING HUD, supra note 7, at 20.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Alt-A mortgage loans are somewhat risky mortgages where a borrower is unable to
provide “complete documentation of his assets or the amount or source of his income.”
MARK ADELSON, NOMURA FIXED INCOME RESEARCH, A JOURNEY TO THE ALT-A ZONE 1-2
(2003), available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/nomura_journey_060303.pdf. In
addition to this typical Alt-A attribute, Alt-A loan pools include loans classified as
“subprime.” Id. at 3. The usual subprime borrower has either been delinquent on housing
payments at least annually, or has a FICO score lower than 620. Id.
41
RETOOLING HUD, supra note 7, at 20.
42
Id.
43
Greenwich Fin. Servs. Distressed Mortg. Fund 3, LLC v. Countrywide Fin. Corp.,
654 F. Supp. 2d 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), appeal dismissed, 603 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2010).
44
RETOOLING HUD, supra note 7, at 20.
35
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Because the securitization transactions in the PLS home mortgage
context are complex, some explanation is necessary for a basic
understanding. If a financial institution owns a group of mortgages,
which it either entered into itself or bought from another institution, it
45
can sell them to a trust. The trust issues bonds to pay for the
mortgages, called mortgage-backed securities (hereinafter “MBS”), and
46
these bonds are backed by the loans now owned by the trust. The trust
holds the loans, placing them far from the original institution’s
creditors, and a third-party loan servicer manages the loans for “the
47
benefit of the MBS holders.” The servicer, usually a corporate
subsidiary of the mortgage originator, collects payments from
homeowners, handles paperwork, sells properties in the event of
48
foreclosure, and entertains mortgage modification requests. The
contract between the servicer and the trust is called a pooling and
servicing agreement and usually includes limits on modifying
49
mortgages that are in or near default.
II. BACKGROUND OF HOME MORTGAGE-RELATED
LEGISLATION
A. The Truth in Lending Act
Enacted in 1968, the purpose of the TILA is to promote the
50
“informed use of credit” by consumers. The statute is intended to
provide consumers with “a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that
the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit
51
terms available to him.” The 1967 Committee Reports explained that
requiring creditors to consistently and uniformly disclose credit
information, by requiring the inclusion of all mandatory charges in the

45

Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 200
and H.R. 225 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 46 (2009) (written
testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_
house_hearings&docid=f:46615.pdf.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 46-47.
48
Id. at 47.
49
Id.
50
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2010).
51
Id.
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calculation of the percentage rate, would give consumers the
information needed to make an informed decision on using and
52
comparing credit rates and costs. Thus, the original focus of TILA was
on the cost of credit.
William T. Cahill, a Republican congressman from New Jersey
(and former New Jersey Governor) proposed the home mortgage
amendments to TILA, which were included in the bill without further
53
debate. These amendments were primarily intended to prevent
homeowners from being victims of “vicious secondary mortgage
54
schemes.” Representative Cahill explained that “in many cases [a
homeowner entering into a consumer credit transaction] is never
informed nor aware that his home is being made subject to a
55
mortgage.” The amendments, accepted by the Senate and adopted in
the final version of TILA, require creditors to disclose that they are
56
holding a security interest in the debtor’s home. The amendments set
forth a three-pronged approach to regulate the secondary mortgage
market. First, they “require a 3-day waiting period before a second
57
mortgage transaction can be completed.” Second, they require
58
disclosure that the credit is secured by a mortgage on the residence.
Lastly, the amendments enlarge consumers’ legal rights when
59
purchasing mortgages from an original home improvement contractor.
B. The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act
The Homes Act was signed into law by President Barack Obama
60
on May 20, 2009. Two major elements comprise this Act. First, it
amends the Housing Act of 1949 to require mortgagees, upon either
actual or imminent default of a guaranteed mortgage, to participate in
52

H.R. REP. NO. 90-1040, at 13 (1967); S. REP. NO. 90-392, at 3 (1967).
Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 220 (1981).
54
114 CONG. REC. 1611 (1968) (statement of Rep, Cahill).
55
Id.
56
Anderson Bros. Ford, 452 U.S. at 221-22.
57
114 CONG. REC. 5024 (1968).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Reforms for American
Homeowners
and
Consumers
(May
20,
2009),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/reforms-for-american-homeowners-andconsumers-president-obama-signs-the-helping-families-save-their-homes-act-and-the-fraudenforcement-and-recovery-act.
53

RODGERS (DO NOT DELETE)

2010

12/6/2010 12:01 PM

MORTGAGE MODIFICATION MELTDOWN

139

61

loss mitigation instead of foreclosure. The Act also permits the HUD
Secretary to: (a) “authorize the modification of mortgages;” and (b)
establish a program for payment of a partial claim to a mortgagee who
agrees to apply the claim amount to payment of a mortgage on a 1- to 462
family residence. The Act also allows the Secretary to: (a) “authorize
compensation to the mortgagee for lost income on monthly mortgage
payments due to interest rate reduction;” (b) reimburse the mortgagee
from a guaranty fund in connection with “activities that the mortgagee
is required to undertake concerning repayment by the mortgagor of the
amount owed” to HUD; (c) “authorize payments to the mortgagee on
behalf of the borrower,” under terms defined by HUD; and (d) authorize
mortgage modification “with terms extended up to 40 years. . .” from
63
the modification date. Lastly, the Act also imparts the Secretary with
the authority to assign to HUD a guaranteed mortgage on a family
residence presently defaulting or facing imminent default, and
prescribes procedures for HUD for payment of guarantee, disposition,
64
and loan servicing.
The second element of the Homes Act is its four major changes to
TILA. First, the Act alters the TILA fiduciary duty requirements for
servicers of pooled residential mortgages. Under the Act, any residential
mortgage servicer that enters into “qualified loss mitigation plans” for
mortgages that originated before the date of enactment of the Homes
Act (including securitized or “bundled” mortgages), must honor these
new fiduciary duty obligations that result as a matter of entering into a
65
mortgage modification plan. Second, the Act protects servicers from
any liability if the servicer is determined to be acting in the best
interests of all other investors and parties, and indicates that such
servicers will not be subject to equitable liability based solely upon the
66
execution of a “qualified loss mitigation plan.” Third, the Act states
that any person, including a trustee, issuer, or loan originator, will not
be liable for money damages or be subject to any equitable relief, based
solely upon that person’s cooperation with a servicer in implementing

61
62
63
64
65
66

Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632.
Id. at § 101.
Id.
Id.
Id. at § 129.
Id.
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67

such a plan. Lastly, the Act imposes liability upon a servicer (including
a trustee, issuer, or loan originator) for actual fraud in the origination or
servicing of a loan, in the implementation of a “qualified loss mitigation
plan,” or for violating any state or federal predatory lending law that
68
regulates home mortgages. Typical predatory lending practices include
deceitful loan agreements, fraud, influencing borrowers through
deceptive sales presentations, and abusing consumers’ lack of
69
understanding of contract terms. The actors involved in predatory
lending schemes can include mortgage brokers, bankers, realtors,
appraisers, home improvement contractors, and any others directly or
70
indirectly involved in the lending process.
III. PAST ATTEMPTS AT HOME MORTGAGE REFORM AND
WHY THEY FAILED
A. Hope Now
Hope Now is “an alliance between counselors, mortgage
companies, investors, and other mortgage market participants,” whose
mission is to organize “outreach efforts to help homeowners in distress
to help them stay in their homes, and. . .create a unified, coordinated
71
plan to reach and help as many homeowners as possible.” The program
began in October 2007, in the face of the mortgage crisis, through a
72
joint effort between the Treasury Department and HUD. Essentially,
Hope Now is an unfunded government-organized network of industry
participants who assist delinquent, or soon to be delinquent, borrowers
in modifying the terms of their mortgage, or setting up alternative
73
payment plans. However, Hope Now’s Executive Director, Faith
67

Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §129 123 Stat.
1632, 1639.
68
Id.
69
Agpar, supra note 17, at 101 n.1.
70
Id.
71
Are You Eligible?, HOPE NOW, http://www.hopenow.com/hopenow-aboutus.php (last
visited Oct. 25, 2010).
72
Press Release, Hope Now, Hope Now Alliance Created to Help Distressed
Homeowners (Oct. 10, 2007), available at http://www.fsround.org/media/pdfs/
AllianceRelease.pdf.
73
SHILLER, supra note 21, at 112; Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Treasury Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
the Treasury, Remarks before the New York Society of Securities Analysts (Jan. 7, 2008),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp757.htm.
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Schwartz, was also an executive at Option One Mortgage — a subprime
74
lender — at the time of her appointment to Hope Now. Many industry
participants in the program oppose such government intervention, which
75
would modify mortgages and create losses for their companies.
Irrespective of the shaky foundations of Hope Now, it has never
provided relief to distressed homeowners. The program claimed to have
helped 2.7 million borrowers as of October 2008, including 1.6 million
homeowners with subprime loans; however, less than 20% of those
76
mortgage modifications actually resulted in a lower monthly payment.
In the face of a serious mortgage crisis, a telephone hotline to credit
counselors — funded by private banks or mortgage companies — was a
weak effort to provide assistance to homeowners; it is generally
considered a failed program.
B. Hope for Homeowners Program
Hope for Homeowners was established by Congress in July 2008,
authorizing the Federal Housing Administration (hereinafter “FHA”) to
77
insure refinanced distressed mortgages. It was intended to help
approximately 400,000 homeowners with problematic mortgages, but as
of February 2009, only twenty-five of 451 loan applications have
78
successfully closed. Mortgage servicers screen borrowers for the
79
program after they qualify for a trial mortgage modification. If
borrowers qualify, they can then refinance their mortgage into a new
loan through the FHA, while the mortgage investors take a write-down

74

Option One Executive Faith Schwartz Named to Federal Reserve Board’s Consumer
Advisory Council, BUSINESS WIRE, Jan. 24, 2006, http://www.allbusiness.com/bankingfinance/banking-lending-credit-services/5388745-1.html.
75
Lynnley Browning, Distressed Owners Are Frustrated by Aid Group, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/business/02hope.html.
76
Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, supra note 45, at 44;
SONIA GARRISON ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CONTINUED DECAY AND SHAKY
REPAIRS: THE STATE OF SUBPRIME LOANS TODAY 7-8 (2009).
77
Hope for Homeowners Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 1709 (2009).
78
Brian Naylor, Homeowners Rescue Program Shows Slim Benefits, NPR (Feb. 3,
2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100163398. As of September
2009, Hope for Homeowners has only helped ninety-five borrowers move into governmentbacked mortgages. Jessica Holzer, Talks Stall on Mortgage Program, WALL ST. J., Sep. 23,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125373881952135221.html.
79
Tara Siegel Bernard, Slow Start to U.S. Plan for Modifying Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 2009, at B1.
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loss on their investment, and the government insures the new loan. The
main pitfall of the Hope for Homeowners program is that it requires
banks or other investors in mortgages to take a loss by writing down the
mortgage so that the borrower can receive a new government-backed
mortgage. Thus, there is no real benefit to a mortgage holder for
offering assistance to the financially strapped homeowner. As a
consequence, it has shown little progress in reducing foreclosures.
C. FHA Secure Program
The FHA Secure program, starting in August 2007, offered
refinancing for homeowners with non-FHA adjustable rate mortgages,
including those with negative equity, into FHA fixed-rate mortgages,
81
and was predicted to help approximately 240,000 homeowners.
However, the program helped only a few thousand delinquent
82
borrowers refinance before being terminated at the end of 2008.
Senator Christopher Dodd, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee,
explained that “while a good idea, [the program was] not addressing the
magnitude of the problem” because it failed to help those homeowners
with serious threats of impending foreclosure, instead helping those
borrowers who made their payments on time but requested government
83
help before encountering more serious financial difficulties. The
program ended in December 2008 because of the negative impact on the
FHA’s Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund; a letter to current borrowers
explained that maintaining the program would have required loan
premium increases or a total discontinuation of the FHA’s Single84
Family Insurance Program.

80

Id.
Press Release, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Bush Administration to Help Nearly
One-Quarter of a Million Homeowners Refinance, Keep Their Homes (Aug. 31, 2007),
available at http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr07-123.cfm.
82
Michael Corkery, Mortgage ‘Cram-Downs’ Loom as Foreclosures Mount, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 31, 2008, at C1.
83
Rachel L. Swarns, Federal Mortgage Plan Falls Short, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
30, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/business/30fha.html.
84
Letter from Brian D. Montgomery, Assistant Sec’y for Hous., Fed. Hous. Comm’r, to
All Approved Mortgagees (Dec. 19, 2008) (on file with author).
81
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IV. THE HOMES ACT OF 2009: EFFECTS ON OTHER
PROGRAMS, LEGISLATION AND NEW INITIATIVES
A. Amendments to Hope for Homeowners
The Homes Act amended Hope for Homeowners to increase the
affordability of mortgage modifications for borrowers. First, it permits
reduction of the Hope for Homeowners up-front 3% fee to “up to 3%,”
and the exit fee may be reduced from 1.5% to “not more than 1.5%,”
thereby giving HUD the ability to lower the annual insurance premium
85
fees on refinanced loans. Second, the amendments provide financial
incentives for mortgage servicers to utilize refinancing through Hope
for Homeowners by permitting HUD to redistribute any property sale
86
profits, up to 50% of the appreciation, to any senior mortgage holders.
Third, the Act makes Hope for Homeowners program requirements
more consistent with standard FHA practices, thereby reducing the
87
levels of confusing bureaucracy between the two entities. As a result,
all documents, forms and procedures for insuring mortgages under
Hope for Homeowners are the same as those for mortgages insured by
88
the regular FHA Single-Family Insurance Program. Fourth, the Act
moves administration of the program from the Board of Directors of the
Program to the HUD Secretary, placing the Board in a more advisory
89
role, and providing the program with more resources and a dedicated
staff within HUD. The Board consists of the Treasury Secretary, HUD
Secretary, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and the Chairman
90
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Company.
Although these amendments increase the affordability of
refinancing through Hope for Homeowners, and create financial
85
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 202, 123
Stat. 1632, 1642.
86
Id.
87
Id.; Preserving Home Ownership: Progress Needed to Prevent Foreclosures:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 198-202
(2009) (prepared statement of Allen H. Jones, Default Management Policy Executive, Bank
of America), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
111_senate_hearings&docid=f:55032.pdf.
88
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 § 102.
89
Id.
90
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Bush Administration Announces
Flexibility for “Hope For Homeowners” Program (Nov. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr08-178.cfm.
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incentives for lenders to utilize this program, there are many critics who
feel the changes do not go far enough to limit the number of
foreclosures. One major issue is that the incentives are servicer-based
91
rather than providing borrowers with direct financial assistance. Those
servicer incentives, usually an initial percentage of the loan and a future
payment based on any appreciated property value, are not even
92
considered incentives to mortgage industry insiders. These percentage
fees are considered to be too low to encourage active participation in
Hope for Homeowners because the program requires a mortgage holder
93
to fully release the borrower from indebtedness. As a result, only those
mortgages in serious risk of foreclosure are given over to the program
94
since the mortgage holders have nothing else to lose. The program also
does not address homeowners who are currently unemployed and
95
cannot make any payments, a common situation that shows little
96
potential for mortgage modification from servicers or investors.
B. Amendments to TILA
The Homes Act also makes amendments to Section 129A of TILA,
which was originally enacted by the Housing and Economic Recovery
97
Act of 2008, to provide residential mortgage servicers with a safe
harbor from liability in connection with entering “qualified loss
98
mitigation plans” with borrowers. This safe harbor is extended to
trustees, issuers, and loan originators when they cooperate with the
99
servicer in the implementation of a qualified loss mitigation plan. The
91
Adam Weinstein, Congress Mulls Radical Changes for Servicers, Lenders to Add
Help for Homeowners, DEFAULT SERVICING NEWS, Sept. 10, 2009, http://www.dsnews.com
/articles/congress-mulls-radical-changes-for-servicers-lenders-to-add-help-homeowners2009-09-10.
92
Letter from John A. Courson, President and CEO, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, to
Regulations Div., HUD (Mar. 9, 2009), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org
/files/AU/2009/MBACommentLetter_H4H_3-9-2009.pdf.
93
Id.
94
Jessica Holzer, Talks Stall on Mortgage Program, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125373881952135221.html.
95
Weinstein, supra note 91.
96
Steven Greenhouse, 65 and Up and Looking for Work, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2009, at
B1.
97
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654.
98
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §201, 123 Stat.
1632, 1638.
99
Id. A “qualified loss mitigation plan” is defined in the Act as being either “a

RODGERS (DO NOT DELETE)

2010

MORTGAGE MODIFICATION MELTDOWN

12/6/2010 12:01 PM

145

amended Section 129A states that whenever a servicer of residential
mortgages agrees to enter into a qualified loss mitigation plan with
respect to one or more residential mortgages that originated before the
date of enactment of the Homes Act, including mortgages held in
securitization or other investment vehicles, the servicer’s fiduciary duty
to maximize the net present value of the mortgages will be “construed
to apply to all such investors and parties, and not to any individual party
100
or group of parties.” The servicer satisfies this duty if the servicer
implements a qualified loss mitigation plan that meets the following
criteria: (i) a default on payments has occurred, is imminent, or is
reasonably foreseeable; (ii) a mortgagee occupies the property securing
the mortgage as his or her principal residence; and (iii) the servicer
reasonably determined that the application of a qualified loss mitigation
plan will likely provide an anticipated recovery on the outstanding
principal mortgage debt that would exceed recovery through
101
foreclosure. The safe harbor provision kicks in at this point, and a
servicer deemed to be acting in the best interests of all parties will not
be liable to any party based solely on the implementation of the
102
qualified loss mitigation plan. Furthermore, no person, including a
trustee, issuer or loan originator, will be liable for money damages or be
subject to an injunction based solely upon the cooperation of that person
103
with servicer in order to implement the qualified loss mitigation plan.
The Homes Act’s second major amendment to TILA is the
104
addition of a disclosure requirement. Within thirty days after a
mortgage is sold or transferred to a third party, the creditor (the new
owner or assignee of the mortgage) must notify the borrower in writing
of (a) the identity and contact information of the new creditor, (b) the
date of transfer, (c) a way to reach the new creditor’s agent, (d) the
refinancing of a mortgage under the Hope for Homeowners program” and/or “a residential
loan modification, workout, or other loss mitigation plan, including to the extent that the
Secretary of the Treasury determines appropriate, a loan sale, real property disposition, trial
modification, pre-foreclosure sale, and deed in lieu of foreclosure, that is described or
authorized in guidelines issued by the Secretary…under the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008; refinancing of a mortgage under the HOPE Program.” Id.
100
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §201, 123
Stat. 1632, 1638 (emphasis added).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at § 404.
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location where the transfer of mortgage ownership is recorded, and (e)
105
any other relevant information regarding the new creditor.
Additionally, this amendment includes a provision giving borrowers a
private right of action against the new creditor for non-compliance with
106
this new disclosure requirement. These remedies are in addition to
attorney’s fees for successful litigants, which were already available
107
under TILA.
These two amendments may encourage mortgage servicers to
reduce foreclosures by providing a modification plan for borrowers. The
safe harbor provision gives lenders that enter into qualified loss
mitigation plans with borrowers an extra level of liability protection
from both secondary investors in a securitized mortgage fund and the
108
borrowers themselves. The Act’s definition for a qualified loss
mitigation plan is quite broad as well, giving lenders a wide variety of
109
options to help distressed homeowners. In addition, element (ii),
requiring that a borrower occupy the property securing the mortgage as
his or her principal residence, ensures that only needy individuals, not
those with several homes, are capable of receiving assistance from a
mortgage servicer through this plan.
The new secondary mortgage market disclosure requirements
mainly benefit consumers. Under this provision, borrowers must be
provided with extensive contact details for secondary investors,
enabling these borrowers to communicate their concerns more
effectively in the event of late payments, foreclosure worries, or their
family’s changing financial situation. The threat of a private right of
action by the consumer may also be a considerable tool for compliance
against the secondary market investors.
From the borrower’s perspective, there are no real downsides to
these two TILA amendments. However, the amendments may generate
105

Id.
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §404, 123
Stat. 1632, 1658. Consumers are able to recover actual damages, as well as maximum
statutory damages of $4000 in an individual action, or the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of a
creditor’s net worth in a class action. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2010).
107
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3); Purtle v. Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc., 91 F.3d 797, 799-800
(6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1252 (1997).
108
Gretchen Morgenson, A Reality Check on Mortgage Modification, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
25, 2009, at BU1.
109
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §201 123
Stat. 1632, 1639.
106
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problems for investors in securitized mortgage funds, because investors
will only be able to assert claims against servicers who modify loans
when an express contractual provision in the “pooling and servicing
110
agreement” expressly prohibits loan modification. Investors in funds
without these agreements will be unable to impose liability on a servicer
if that servicer chooses to enter into a qualified loss mitigation plan with
a homeowner.
The other main problem with the new disclosure requirement is
administrative in nature. New mortgage servicers are already required to
send out servicing transfer statements under the federal Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act when they assign, sell or transfer a mortgage
111
to another lender or servicer. Still, the Homes Act’s updated
disclosure requirement introduces an extra level of transparency into the
secondary mortgage market, and increases risks of litigation against
primary and interim purchasers of loans. This litigation risk is most
likely a signal from Congress to the secondary mortgage industry to
acknowledge that their investments depend on a real person, the
homeowner, and so they should work with the borrower to create a
payment plan instead of choosing foreclosure.
V. COMPARISON WITH THE SAVE NEW JERSEY HOMES
ACT OF 2008
Although the home mortgage crisis caused economic disruption
across the United States, the home mortgage crisis deeply affected the
112
State of New Jersey in particular. In 2008, the rate of foreclosures in
New Jersey rose from one in every 265 homes to one in every 201
113
homes. On a national scale in 2008, the rate of foreclosure was one in
114
every 171 homes. In response to this growing concern in the State and
throughout the nation, Governor Jon Corzine signed the Save New
Jersey Homes Act of 2008 on September 15, 2008, and it remains in
115
effect until January 1, 2011. This statute is intended to protect only
110

Morgenson, supra note 108.
12 U.S.C.S. § 2605(a) (LexisNexis 2010).
112
Kareem Fahim & Janet Roberts, In New Jersey, Dreams of a Better Life Dashed by
Foreclosure Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2009, at NJ1.
113
Beth Fitzgerald, Foreclosure Rate Up 140% in the State, Dramatic Increase from
April to June, THE STAR-LEDGER, July 26, 2008, at 1.
114
Id.
115
Save New Jersey Homes Act of 2008, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-40 (West 2008).
111
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116

homeowners who signed introductory rate mortgages that had low
introductory “teaser rates,” which bumped up to a higher rate later in the
117
mortgage period and increased the risk of default or foreclosure. The
118
statute, meant to be construed liberally, allows introductory rate
mortgage borrowers to continue making monthly payments under the
introductory rate for three additional years, beginning when the higher
119
rate would take effect. Like the federal Homes Act, the borrower must
120
occupy the property as his or her principal residence, so a person’s
vacation home in New Jersey is not eligible for introductory rate
extension. When the lender begins seriously considering foreclosure on
a property, it must alert the borrower in a large, bold-printed notice of
121
these new rights under the statute. This notice packet must include the
actual form to receive a three-year extension and list any other
122
alternatives to foreclosure, such as possible refinancing options. This
entire packet of information must be sent in a detailed envelope
123
indicating its contents to the borrower. The borrower must submit a
certification of extension form back to the creditor, which includes:
(1) the name of the borrower; (2) the address of the property; and (3)
an affirmative statement that the eligible borrower: (a) does not have
sufficient monthly income. . .to pay the monthly payments that will
apply after the date that the interest rate resets; (b) requests the
116

The New Jersey Legislature defined an introductory rate as such:
(1) an introductory payment rate option that is set at least 3 percent below the
fully indexed rate at the time the loan was originated and payments may adjust
by more than 3 percent at the reset date regardless of whether the variable rate
index has increased; or (2) an interest rate that may adjust by more than 2
percent at the end of the initial fixed rate period of the loan and which,
notwithstanding the payment rate in effect, had an interest rate at origination of
more than 200 basis points over the Freddie Mac 30-year conventional interest
rate and which provides for an introductory rate that is set below the fully
indexed rate at the time the loan was originated and may adjust at the reset date
regardless of whether the variable rate index has increased.
Id. at § 46:10B-38.
117
ASSEMBLY FIN. INST. AND INS. COMM., FLOOR STATEMENT, Assemb. 2780, 2008
Sess.,
212th
Leg.
(N.J.
2008),
available
at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us
/2008/Bills/A3000/2780_S2.PDF.
118
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-45.
119
Id. at § 46:10B-40(d).
120
Id. at § 46:10B-38.
121
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-41(a)-(c) (West 2008).
122
Id.
123
Id. at § 46:10B-45.
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period of extension; (c) agrees to continue, during the period of
extension, monthly payments, which shall include principal and
interest calculated at the introductory rate. . .as well as amounts for
taxes, insurance, and any other amounts being paid under the terms
of the mortgage prior to the interest rate reset; (d) agrees to pay the
creditor, at the time of the full repayment of the introductory rate
mortgage, any interest deferred on account of the period of
extension; (e) agrees to accept the creditor’s. . .modification of
mortgage on the property to secure the repayment of the interest
deferred on account of the period of extension; and (f) agrees to sign
a. . .form that contains the terms of the period of extension and any
documentation necessary to establish or record the modification of
124
mortgage.

Any borrower who knowingly makes material misrepresentations
125
in this certification is guilty of a fourth degree crime under this statute.
Similar to the federal Homes Act, the New Jersey statute also carries
with it a private right of action for the borrower if a creditor “willfully
126
violates any provision of [the] act.”
Although there are some comparisons with the federal Homes Act,
the main difference is that the federal legislation in this area encourages
loan servicers to make voluntary efforts to encourage mortgage
modification, while the New Jersey law actually provides for mandatory
mortgage modification by extending introductory rate periods beyond
the original contract terms. The response by the mortgage industry to
this sort of provision was the same refrain used in response to the threat
of judicial modification through bankruptcy courts: increasing lending
costs through higher interest rates or down payments to make up for
127
legislatively-imposed losses.

124

Id. at § 46:10B-40(b).
Id. at § 46:10B-40(c).
126
Id. at § 46:10B-43.
127
Helping Families Save their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, supra note 45, at 36
(testimony of Adam J. Levitin); Michael Corkery, Mortgage ‘Cram-Downs’ Loom as
Foreclosures Mount, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2008, at C1.
125
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VI. EFFECT OF THE HOMES ACT AND AVENUES FOR
ADDITIONAL REFORM
A. Litigation Impact
In Greenwich Financial Services Distressed Mortgage Fund 3,
128
LLC v. Countrywide Financial Corp., the District Court determined,
inter alia, that jurisdiction surrounding the Homes Act’s amendments to
129
TILA is appropriately found in state, rather than federal, court. The
case involved a dispute between a putative class of plaintiffs, holders of
mortgage-backed securities, and the defendant loan servicer,
130
Countrywide. After the housing market plummeted, Countrywide was
131
charged with violating predatory lending laws in various states. The
settlement agreement included modifying approximately 400,000 loans,
and providing over eight billion dollars in relief aid for homeowners
132
serviced by the company. The plaintiff investors’ portfolio sustained
considerable losses because of these incidental mortgage modifications,
and plaintiffs alleged that Countrywide could only modify mortgages
within the fund after it purchased the mortgages, thereby transferring
133
the loss from the investment fund.
Countrywide argued that federal jurisdiction was proper because
(1) under the Class Action Fairness Act (hereinafter “CAFA”) plaintiffs
sought class action certification, the parties were minimally diverse, and
134
the amount in controversy exceeded five million dollars; and (2)
135
because plaintiffs’ claims introduced substantial federal questions.
The investors disagreed, countering that an exception to CAFA
136
jurisdiction applied, their allegations did not present federal questions,
128

Greenwich Fin. Servs. Distressed Mortg. Fund 3, LLC v. Countrywide Fin. Corp.,
654 F. Supp. 2d 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), appeal dismissed, 603 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2010).
Initially the plaintiffs filed suit in New York State Supreme Court, and Countrywide
removed to the Southern District of New York; the cited opinion concerns the plaintiffs’
motion to remand back to state court. Id. at 194.
129
Id. at 203-04.
130
Id. at 193.
131
Id.
132
Id.; Vikas Bajaj, Fund Investors Sue Countrywide Over Loan Modifications, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2008, at B8.
133
Countrywide, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 194.
134
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (West 2005).
135
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (West 2005).
136
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(C) (“[D]istrict courts shall [not] have original
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and Countrywide’s federal defense was insufficient to create subject
137
matter jurisdiction. Countrywide’s defense raised the issue of the
138
Homes Act’s servicer safe harbor amendments, discussed infra, and
assuming that their mortgage modification settlement plan constituted a
“qualified loss mitigation plan,” then the statutory provisions create a
139
federal presumption against liability when servicers modify loans.
Under the law, the plaintiff investors bear the burden of overcoming
140
that presumption. Countrywide argued that because it was the
plaintiff’s burden, “federal law [was] a necessary element of their claim
and therefore a federal forum [was] required under Supreme Court
141
precedent.”
The Court disagreed, explaining that plaintiffs’ claims depended
only on common law theories of contract interpretation, and
Countrywide had the burden to show why TILA precluded the
142
investors’ claims. Countrywide argued that TILA altered the state law
of contract to require a specific rule of construction for pooling and
143
servicing agreements.
However, the Court disagreed with
144
Countrywide’s interpretation of the TILA safe harbor provision. It
concluded instead that regardless of any state law changes, there was no
evidence that TILA modified the common law cause of action for
145
breach of contract.
This case is one of the first that clearly demonstrates the potential
ineffectiveness of the Homes Act. In this instance, it pitted investors in
mortgage-backed securities against troubled homeowners, leaving the
146
loan servicers in the middle armed with limited options. Through the
jurisdiction…[over] any class action that solely involves a claim…that relates to the rights,
duties (including fiduciary duties), and obligations relating to or created by or pursuant to
any security….”).
137
Countrywide, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 195.
138
15 U.S.C. § 1639(a) (2009).
139
Brief of Defendant at 16, Greenwich Fin. Servs. Distressed Mort. Fund 3, LLC v.
Countrywide Fin. Corp., 654 F. Supp. 2d 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 08 Civ. 11343).
140
Id. at 13-14.
141
Id. at 11-12 (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S.
308 (2005)).
142
Countrywide, 654 F. Supp. 2d at 202-03.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide Loses Ruling in Loan Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
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Homes Act, Congress has charged mortgage servicers with keeping
homeowners in their homes by offering monetary incentives, and has
attempted to limit liability for cooperative servicers who engage in
good-faith mortgage modification. At the same time, investors are
losing out because some contracts contain provisions that prohibit such
147
modification. Granted, the opinion in Countrywide only remands the
action to state court, at which point a judge may rule that the loan
servicer’s liability is ultimately shielded by the new safe harbor
provision, but that is still an open question at this point. In response,
there should be a clear move by servicing companies and mortgagebacked investor funds to remove impediments to loan modification.
Such a move within the mortgage industry would surely benefit
homeowners because servicers would no longer be threatened with
lawsuits by their investors, and could therefore more willingly engage in
mortgage modification procedures.
B. Bankruptcy Provisions Will Increase Opportunities for
Mortgage Modification.
Although the Homes Act aims to help homeowners avoid
foreclosure, its financial servicer incentives are at odds with pooling and
servicing agreements between servicers and investors of mortgagebacked securities. These pooling and servicing agreements limit the
ability of servicers to engage in mortgage modification, making it nearly
impossible for servicers to operate within the current version of the
148
Homes Act. One significant proposal that did not make it to the final
version of the statute granted authority to the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts to
149
modify residential mortgage agreements. Senator Durbin, the sponsor
of this amendment, explained provision as follows:
We literally give to the banks control over whether a family in
foreclosure can go into bankruptcy. [A]nybody facing foreclosure who is delinquent for at least 60 days on a home that is valued at no
more than $729,000, with a mortgage that was written no later than
2008 - has to show up at the bank at least 45 days before they file
2009, at B1.
147
Id.
148
Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, supra note 45, at 38
(written testimony of Adam J. Levitin).
149
155 CONG. REC. S4915, 4917-4918 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Sen. Dick
Durbin).
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bankruptcy and present all the economic information, all the
financial documents the bank would need for a mortgage - proof of
income, indication of net worth. If the bank. . .offers them a
renegotiated mortgage - a mortgage which will basically allow them
to stay in the home. . .or offers hope for home refinancing. . .and the
person facing foreclosure does not take that offer, then that same
family in foreclosure cannot use the bankruptcy court to rewrite the
mortgage. So in other words, the banks ultimately have the key to the
150
courthouse.

Currently, federal bankruptcy judges are authorized “to modify
debt on a vacation home, an investment property, a credit card, a car
151
152
loan, even a yacht,” but not a primary residence. The policy behind
the special protection for principal residences is that Congress believed,
in 1978, that if lenders were shielded from taking a loss in bankruptcy,
competition between lenders would result in transferring these gains to
consumers in the form of lower loan costs, and would therefore
153
encourage homeownership. Unfortunately, this economic belief is
misplaced, since bankruptcy modification risk is not calculated into
residential mortgage pricing or mortgage insurance pricing, and there is
154
no noticeable effect on U.S. homeownership rates. In fact, bankruptcy
is designed to give creditors at least as much as they might recover in
155
foreclosure, so there is little reason to suggest that the mortgage
industry would price against judicial modification through the
bankruptcy courts. If U.S. Bankruptcy Judges are ever granted this
additional power, mortgage servicers and lenders may make stronger
efforts to develop modification plans because of the potential for less
156
favorable judicial modification.
Unfortunately, the Durbin
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were not passed, removing this
great potential for reducing foreclosures through the judicial process.

150

Id. at 4917.
Id. at 4919 (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley).
152
11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1322(b)(2) (2005); Stephen Labaton, Ailing, Banks Still
Field Strong Lobby at Capitol, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, at A1.
153
155 CONG. REC. S4915, 4924 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl);
Adam J. Levitin, Helping Homeowners: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 3
H.L.P.R. ONLINE 1, 7 (2009). http://www.hlpronline.com/Levitin_HLPR_011909.pdf;
154
Levitin, supra note 153.
155
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (2005).
156
RETOOLING HUD, supra note 7, at 17.
151
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C. The Save New Jersey Homes Act Offers More Direct Route for
Homeowners.
Compared to the Homes Act, which offers financial and liabilitylimiting incentives for mortgage servicers, the New Jersey Act actually
gives direct relief to homeowners with introductory rate mortgages. The
New Jersey legislation, discussed supra, allows homeowners to extend
their introductory rate for three additional years, instead of having a
157
higher monthly payment as a result of an adjustable rate. Presumably,
the New Jersey legislature believed that three years would be the
appropriate amount of time for financially distressed homeowners to
recover since the statute’s sunset provision causes expiration on January
158
1, 2011. If financial recovery takes longer, however, hopefully the
legislature will renew the statute for a longer period. Like the Homes
Act, the New Jersey statute also protects the homeowners most in need
of government intervention and those targeted by such introductory rate
mortgages, by only allowing the rate extension for a property that is
occupied by the borrower as his principal residence.
Still, the New Jersey Act requires mortgage servicers involved
with mortgage-backed security trusts to effectively break their contracts
with those trusts. By engaging in mortgage modification at the behest of
the State legislature, the income streams to investors are compromised,
and the servicers may even be prohibited from modification by the
pooling and servicing agreement. It will be interesting to see if New
Jersey courts hear contract cases between servicers and investors, like
Countrywide, and if they will decide whether the statute violates New
Jersey common law contract principles. This is a potential weakness in
the statute that could be remedied through the use of a bankruptcy
amendment in the federal Homes Act, since there are no bankruptcy
forums in the state courts.
D. Potential Policies That May Stem the Tide.
Consumers must make informed decisions when signing a
mortgage, but in some low-income regions the resources of
sophisticated financial advisors are unavailable. It is essential that all
types of consumers be able to access helpful and accurate information
157
158

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-40(a) (West 2008).
Id. at § 46:10B-36.
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before entering into an expensive transaction. Three avenues for reform
should be pursued: (1) expanding public interest legal and financial
advising firms dedicated to providing low-income communities with
sound financial advice; (2) creating a federal Commission for Financial
Product Safety that would serve as a resource for information and create
regulations to ensure safety of risky financial products; and (3)
improving the standard mortgage contract to provide for default-option
financial planning.
A major factor contributing to the subprime mortgage crisis was
financial ignorance of many consumers, coupled with predatory lending
practices. As discussed earlier, the biggest victims are often low-income
159
neighborhoods comprised of minority groups. While banks and
mortgage brokers must change such discriminatory lending practices,
local community institutions may be able to provide consumer financial
education to residents. Universities, specifically law schools and
business schools, should offer such services free of charge, and in
conjunction with social justice or pro bono projects. Providing such
information about the pros and cons of different types of loans,
explained in a simple way, will arm low-income residents with the
knowledge necessary to make an educated financial decision.
The second area of reform should be the creation of a dedicated
financial products safety agency. The Federal Trade Commission’s
Bureau of Consumer Protection states that one of its goals is to
“protect[] consumers from deceptive and unfair practices in the
financial services industry, including protecting consumers from
predatory or discriminatory lending practices, as well as deceptive or
unfair loan servicing, debt collection, and credit counseling or other
160
debt assistance practices,” however, the Federal Trade Commission is
already stretched thin, which is why there is a need to develop a
separate agency. This regulatory agency would research new financial
products to discover their short- and long-term effects, levels of risk,
and tax consequences, and pass any regulations necessary to ensure
consumers’ safety in purchasing such a product. As of the date of this
Note, financial institutions still engage in risky practices, and most
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proposed regulations have generally been stalled in Congress. Until
forceful consumer financial product safety regulations are passed, many
homeowners will still be at grave risk of purchasing subprime, inferior
mortgages.
Lastly, the mortgage industry should make improvements to the
standard mortgage contract and create other coordinated policies that
discourage foreclosures. The federal government, as part owner of
several failing financial institutions and the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac
mortgages, should help direct the course to decreasing the national
162
mortgage debt. These policies should include a moratorium on
foreclosures, allowing current foreclosed property to sell and equalize
the market. Also, there should be standardized policies for mortgage
modifications, the possibility for reducing principal debt, or allowing
the Treasury Department to buy out some delinquent mortgages at a
discount price, thereby shifting losses from private investors to the
163
taxpayers.
A true solution to the foreclosure crisis must include all types of
initiatives that can help reduce the national mortgage debt. Private
industry efforts, or simply waiting for a more organic housing market
recovery, will prove to be just as fruitless as it has been since the end of
2007. Families across the country suffering through this crisis, even
those few that are given the chance to modify their mortgage terms,
need effective reform. The federal government and mortgage industry
must come up with viable solutions to help the nation get itself out of
this costly crisis.
CONCLUSION
The Homes Act, as it stands, does not do enough to provide direct
assistance to frustrated homeowners facing a slow economic recovery.
And while banks or investors might balk at taking financial losses by
modifying mortgages, some consumers are starting to realize they have
another option: the voluntary default. Homeowners might choose to
voluntarily default on their mortgage if their mortgage debt outweighs
161
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the worth of their house. Companies like ‘You Walk Away’ advertise
“strategic” default plans, which include consultations with real estate
attorneys, advice on how to avoid harassment by creditors, and
165
education about the effects on a credit score. Mortgage modification
plans may work for many people, especially those with jobs, but many
who are unemployed are simply extending the period until inevitable
foreclosure. If the long-term sustainability of a mortgage payment is
unlikely, then even a lower payment may not be in the best financial
interest of an individual or family. An onslaught of voluntary defaults
might even produce beneficial economic results. There might be an
even greater incentive to make effective home mortgage modifications
if a wave of voluntary foreclosures strikes fear into the hearts of
166
banking institutions.
Bankruptcy provisions would effectively produce a similar result
of encouraging meaningful mortgage modification plans for
homeowners. The potential for more significant losses through judicial
modification would likely encourage mortgage servicers and lenders to
make greater strides in developing modification plans for distressed
homeowners. In a world of judicially imposed mortgage modification,
however, there could be the potential for including the cost of
bankruptcy modification into future mortgage lending. Such increased
lending costs might not be a bad thing, and may likely have the effect of
home mortgage lending only to those who can truly afford it.
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